


From distribution networks to smart distribution systems: Rethinking the regulation of European electricity DSOs

- Results of the THINK study -

Sophia Ruester
CEDEC Workshop on Smart Grids
Brussels, 6 November 2013




With smart distribution systems

- DSOs cannot continue to do “business-as-usual”
- Data volumes and the value of data will increase drastically

Background

Technological advances are reshaping today's electricity market

Advent of "distributed energy resources" (DER):



Challenges:

- Increased volatility of net demand
- Much variation and uncertainty of flows in D grid and at T interface (even reverse flows)
- Network architecture becoming more complex & expensive

Potentials:

- Diversity of services with economic value in local electricity markets
- DER may successfully compete with centralized generation
- New tools for system control by the DSO

3

Background

Why this THINK report?

- In the light of these market developments and resulting challenges & potentials ...
- ... and to contribute to the current debate on DSO regulation (e.g. Smart Grid Task Force, London Forum, Eurelectric, EDSO, etc.)
- ... we ask

1. Why & where do we need to rethink the current regulation of DSOs?


2. How can the regulatory compact be adjusted to incentivize DSOs

- ... to effectively integrate DER into electricity markets?
- ... to effectively employ DER for their own purposes?

4

Background

Whole spectrum of regulation to be reviewed



#1 – Adequate remuneration of DSOs

Revisit regulation

- Increasing amounts of DER require **substantial investments** to
 - Properly connect all new resources
 - Set up ICT infrastructure that empowers DSOs to employ DER for their daily grid operations
- Therefore, two **regulatory mandates**:
 - Account for increasing total costs of distribution (losses, grid reinforcement, etc.),
 - But at the same time also incentivize investments in active system management to cushion those costs
- A **sound regulation** that efficiently incentivizes DSOs to engage in active system management has to take account of:
 - a) Changing OPEX and CAPEX structures
 - b) The optimal choice among both
 - c) How to incentivize DSOs to deploy innovative solutions

#2 – Adequate distribution network tariffs

Revisit tariff design


- **No sound methodology** to design network charges for the different agents that may connect to the grid
 - Moreover,
 - Business models might exploit existing ill-designed network tariffs
 - Absence of economic signals
 - Hidden subsidies
(e.g. volumetric network charges combined with net metering; exemptions from grid tariffs)
 - Grid users become complex, **sophisticated agents**
 - With very diverse consumption and/or production patterns
 - Able (and willing) to react to price signals
- **A sound grid tariff design** should be able to convey efficient economic signals
- Any hidden subsidies should be removed and replaced by sufficient but direct subsidies that do not turn into inefficient signals
 - Tariffs should reflect the true costs (or benefits) of different types of load and generation for the system

#3 – DSO boundary vis-à-vis the TSO


DSOs become active system operators

- General responsibilities of network operators with respect to grid management do not change
... but the set of tools available to perform the tasks is enriched by DER
 - Some of the services DER can provide are relevant for either the TSO or the DSO
... whereas others might be of interest for both types of network operators
- Regulation needs to guide DSO-TSO interactions, in particular in:
- a) ... TSO-DSO **coordination**
 - Hierarchy of decisions for system balancing
 - Protocol of DER committed for which operations, to whom, for which time-frame
 - b) ... TSO-DSO **differentiation**
 - Via a careful product definition
(Time of delivery, geographic scope, technical features)

#4 – DSO boundary vis-à-vis the market Challenges




#4 – DSO boundary vis-à-vis the market Three areas investigated in the report



#4 – DSO boundary vis-à-vis the market

Volumes – and value of – data increase



#4 – DSO boundary vis-à-vis the market

Should new tasks become DSO activities?

[More detailed conclusions on the three individual areas in our report]

In general:

- Tasks may – or may not – be offered at lowest cost and in a more qualitative way by DSOs as compared to other third regulated or commercial agents
- Suitability of a certain model will depend on system-specific conditions
[e.g. potential scale/scope economies, degree of uncertainty regarding best technological solutions, concerns with respect to possible market entry barriers, etc.]
- As system complexity increases, an insufficiently unbundled DSO could either stay with a restricted set of tasks...
... or the DSO could expand its portfolio of activities, but accompanied with an increasing **level of unbundling**
- Mandate **minimum set of requirements on data handling**
[How data are obtained, stored, made available and privacy is preserved – as far as possible independently of from data model]

Synergies between DSOs and ICT

Some thoughts

How to achieve cooperation and synergies between DSOs and ICT companies – while maintaining level-playing field in the market?

- “Joint venture” model?
 - Communication infrastructure for smart grids becoming part of smart grid infrastructure
i.e. falling into regulated domain
 - ICT companies providing their expertise in building and operating this new infrastructure
i.e. generating revenue outside the regulated domain
- Tasks of DSOs could be disaggregated into a set of services
 - Business approach shifting from “managing **assets**”
to “managing a **portfolio of services**”?

Looking forward to your thoughts!

Contact: sophia.ruester@eui.eu

